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Some days ago, Reut Yael Paz published a critical comment on
the Cologne Court’s circumcision decision on this blog. Reut
rigthly criticized the ignorant stance the Court took towards the
challenges of legal pluralism and the conflict of diverging
normative orders at the core of the concrete case – and she
rightly criticized the widespread silence on these matters that
shaped the debate so far.
However, her own distinction between the Public and the Private
remains unclear and therefore problematic. Does religion
exclusively belong to the private sphere? The Cologne courts
did not explicitely problematize that differentiation, and Reut Paz
leaves in the dark how precisely the public / private distinction 
comes into play in conflicts of normative orders.  Furthermore:
Is, from the perspective of a state court,  the relation between
the constitution and orders of religious law not necessarily an
asymmetrical one? (What, as goes without saying, does not
imply that non-state legal orders could simply be ignored.)
Alas, these questions have meanwhile been discussed by
various commentators. What prompts my intervention, though,
despite other pressing issues of the day both public and private,
is a statement made by the author that I find utterly unjustified.
Reut Paz opens her blog posting with a flamboyant postcolonial
overture that sets the tone for a subsequent paragraph where
she adresses what – to her – is obviously one of the central
questions of the issue: “Does this judgement reflect remnants of
the European colonial/civilizing project in its full glory because it is linked to racial discrimination and a strong
Christian (strike out the Judeo-) religious bias?”
The questions is answered in the affirmative: “Although this situation is a classic example of the need to resolve
conflicts between normative orders that need to coexist in the same social field (…) the court – without the
necessary reflections in the court but also beyond – exclusively based its reasoning (on) the German legal
system, a system which in this case also coincides with the Christian understanding of the physical body.”
At this point and regarding that question (which is obviously fairly relevant to the author), Reut Paz is to be
criticized  for a non-differentiated, vague and hence somewhat superficial analysis of the Cologne decision. This
is deplorable, and even more so as she offers in her contribution an excellent explanation and interpretation of
the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision on the Brith Milah and its context in religious law. Yet, here she is simply
wrong. The Cologne judges argued with a remarkable “religious blindness“, with the same historical and socio-
cultural forgetfulness that is to be found among the leading criminal law protagonists of the debate. They did not
base their decision on a (sublime) “Christian understanding oft he physical body“, but expressed in their
judgement the same “anti-religious Zeitgeist” that Patrick Bahners has observed throughout the recent
“circumcision debate“, in particular on the internet.
Yet, why can the  Cologne judges’ take, anti-religious and laicist at first glance, not be classified as Christian
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bias, as subservient assimiliation to a Christian “Leitkultur”? Is there not something clandestine-Christian to be
read in between the lines? Are we not living in a  “still“ deeply Christian society? Is not such a biased society the
social context of the Cologne judges, in the traditionally Catholic Rhineland?
To respond adequately to such questions, cultural, historical and theological knowledge is required. A Knowledge
that in our debates involving constitutional law and religion figures, at least since the Karlsruhe’s Kruzifix
decision, only as a lacuna, a void. The representatives of the Christian churches translate edgy theological
arguments into rather general  civil society talk and position themselves (as Christoph Möllers has just rightly
deplored) with mixed qualities as constitutional law scholars – or delegate issues that could potentially prompt
socio-political conflict straight away to experts of church/state law.
That is very much to the catholic’s disappointment, shameful and regrettable. But for the lawyer and citizen of the
civitas terrena, it is a catastrophy. To cope adequately with the challenges and problems of legal pluralism
requires preconditions that the law and legal scholarship can neither provide nor guarantee. “Legal pluralism is
the great challenge to the unity of public law, here lie the future challenges and tasks for legal science –
problems that can only be resolved through contextualization, and that hence are linked to the fundamentals of
the law“, states Dieter Grimm, pointing to the core of the dilemma. Where the competitive, at the same time
complementary co-existence of a variety of legal systems and normative orders has become part of social reality,
contextual knowledge is needed – and can only be translated from outside into the sphere of the law. Such
contextual knowledge is translated from the adjacent disciplines into legal scholarship by legal sub-fields such
as legal history, legal sociology, legal anthropology etc., but also brought into the spheres of the law by
protagonists and representatives of religious and non-religious normative orders. Today’s societies are in need,
Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure have recently emphasized, of the development of ethical and political
knowledge facilitating tolerance and solidarity.
In the current circumcision debate, such contextual knowledge is only scarcely offered. While one could read
about the smallest medical details of the act, theological and historical comments were rarely provided, both from
Christian perspectives or else. One would have wished for some remarks by an expert of Jewish history and
culture reminding of 19th century debates on the use and practice of Jewish Law in Germany. With her reference
to Israeli jurisprudence and the Israeli Supreme Court’s take on arguments of religious law, Reut Paz fills another
significant void that has not received sufficient attention in the preceding debate.
But why is she wrong with her presumption of a “strong Christian (…) religious bias”?
Reut Paz is wrong because also the Christian understanding of the human body and its physical integrity is
shaped by traditions that must be unbearable, unreasonable demands to the laicist humanist. The human body
is not understood as perfect, as complete and therefore untouchable from the moment of birth. The conditioning
of the body through asceticism, the imitatio Christi through abstinence and physical exercise is, historically, a
central aspect of Christianity – and we find strong ascetic traditions in most religions. In the history of
Christianity, the variety of practices leading to a “completion” of the body ranges from moderate fasting to bloody
interventions in the body’s physical integrity that seem to us  children of modernity rather strange – I think of  the
stigmatized body of Saint Francis or of the medieval mystic Henry Suso (Heinrich Seuse). Suso pierced into the
skin over his heart the monogram of the name of Jesus (IHS), as a symbol for the eternal bond between God
and man (a “precedent of the modern tattoo”, as researchers at Heidelberg University have recently
characterized  that passionate and bloody practice.
The Minnezeichen (sign of passionate love) on Suso’s skin ist, as the Cologne theologian Alex Stock’s rich
theological, historical and cultural interpretations imply, as a name sign subtly intertwined with the Feast of The
Circumcision of Christ, a feast still celebrated by the church in the extraordinary form or its rite als as a
celebration of the name (and naming) of Jesus. One is reminded of the “circumcision of the heart” that has been
emphasized by Moses, Jeremiah and Paul. Obviously, Christianity’s story with circumcision does not end with
Paul (even though one could think so, after having read  the exclusively biblical account provided by the
protestant bavarian “Sonntagsblatt”), and later strands of tradition  are not to be limited to a story of anti-semitic
ressentiment. To the contrary: For Christians, there are sound theological reasons to support and protect a
practice of religious circumcision that is not imposed upon themselves by their own religious norms.
2/5
At this point, I leave it to theologians, historians, athropologists and experts from the cultural studies field to go
into further detail. And, even better, to historically and culturally informed theologians. Currently, at least in
Catholicism, deep explorations and interest in Christian religious traditions are often paralleled by anti-
modernism and anti-intellectual ressentiment. This is much to my regret. For a lawyer interested in contexts of
normative orders while dealing with the challenges of legal pluralism, that situation does not prompt much
optimism. But I continue to hope for more rational voices exploring new sources of (sometimes old) knowledge,
illuminating the Christian heritage that coined our society and its normative orders.
And yet: The challenges of legal pluralism can only be dealt with adequately on the basis of solid knowledge
about religious and cultural traditions. If these traditions are simply discarded as outfashioned, if we forget about
history and culture and place our hope only on the naked law – then a clash of cultures is not to be avoided. With
light-handed presumptions of religious or cultural bias, we are indeed at risk to be faced with a scenario that is
already deplored as a reality by some commentators: a true Kulturkampf.
 
The original German version of these comments has been published on 12 August here on Verfassungsblog.
Translation by the author.
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